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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
of the contract," or to select some other rule determining that
question if it feels that there are sufficiently persuasive reasons
therefore.
-Shelton R. Williams.
CORPORATIONS: WHEN MAY A MONTANA
CORPORATION COLLECT ON ITS SUB-
SCRIPTION CONTRACTS?*
By a well established business practice in Montana a cor-
poration generally commences business immediately upon re-
ceipt of the certificate of incorporation from the secretary of
state. It is generally recognized that a corporation may sue on
its pre-incorporation subscriptions as soon as it may begin busi-
ness. Yet, the case of Enterprise Sheet Metal Works v. Schen-
del,1 decided by the Montana Supreme Court in 1918, held that
a stock subscriber was not obligated on his subscription until
'As has been noted previously the Supreme Court of Montana has
never conclusively answered this question. However at least two Mon-
tana cases, Bank of Commerce v. Fuqua (1891) 11 Mont. 258, 28 P.
291; U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Bordeau (1922) 64 Mont. 60,
208 P. 947, contain dicta to the effect that validity of a contract will
be determined by the law of the place of execution. In McManus v.
Fulton (1929) 85 Mont. 170, 278 P. 126, the place of making and of
performance were the same. But the court applies the law of that
place as the law of the place of making rather than as of the place
of performance; thus justifying the presumption that a Montana Court
will look to the law of the place of contracting to govern essential
validity. Capital Finance Corp. v. Met. Life Ins. Co. (1926) 75 Mont.
460, 243 P. 1061, does not shed much light either way, both Beale and
Cormack claiming it as authority for their respective arguments. While
not conclusive these cases would seem to justify Professor Beale's
contention that Montana may tentatively be placed among the state's
applying to the law of the place of contracting McDonald et al. v.
McNinch (1922) 63 Mont. 308, 206 P. 1096 applies §7935 to a strictly
domestic case to determine the meaning of the parties, which supports
the conclusion that the section does not necessarily state a choice of
law rule. Story v. Stanfield (C. C. A. 9th, 1921) 275 Fed. 401, cites
this Section in enforcing a contract which apparently it assumes was
completed in Montana. But the exact ground upon which the court
Includes this Section In Its reference to Montana law is not clear.
*The writer wishes to acknowledge that Henry I. Grant, Jr., of the
graduating class of 1940 made a helpful study of this problem during
the Fall and Winter of 1939 and 1940.
1(1918) 55 Mont. 42, 173 P. 1059. The case simply gives effect to a
frequently recognized common law defense agains,. calls on either
pre-incorporation or post incorporation subscriptions to an original
issue (but apparently not to a subsequent increase in capitalization),
and concludes that there was nothing in Montana law either requiring
or justifying a change in the rule admitting that defense. Donn &
BAKER, CASES ON C,:AP0.0TrONS (1940) p. 848. This "implied con-
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all of the original issue of the capital stock was subscribed. In
support of this decision, the Court apparently agreed that it was
necessary also to conclude that a Montana corporation cannot
begin doing business until all of its capital stock has been sub-
scribed. It will be the purpose of this comment to show that
the Court erred as to the liability of a stock subscriber on his
subscription. This purpose will be accomplished by showing:
(1) that a Montana corporation has a right to commence busi-
ness upon receipt of the certificate of the secretary of state
showing that articles of incorporation have been filed in his of-
fice; and (2) that certain statutory rights against the stock-
holders, given the corporation creditors, strongly indicate a
corporate right to recover as soon as it creates legal creditors.
Unlike many states,' Montana has no statute expressly stat-
ing that the corporation must have either any particular amount
of its stock subscribed or capital paid in before it may com-
mence business. The problem, therefore, is one of determin-
ing the presumption to be drawn from this legislative silence."
dition precedent" in the subscription was evolved by courts which
assumed that, at the time, the general law uniformly required that
all stock be subscribed for before the corporation could begin doing
business and was predicated upon such supposed requirement. As
noted more fully later, neither of the two leading cases relied on by
the Court as best stating this common law defense, questions the
interrelationship of these two rules. Stoneham Railroad Company
v. Gould (1854) 2 Gray (Mass.) 211; and Livsey v. Omaha Hotel
Company (1876) 5 Neb. 50. Further, the grounds originally put
forth in the Gould case, justifying raising this condition precedent
in the first place, would not be very persuasive on the courts today.
See, note 21, infra.
'See Enterprise Sheet Metal Works v. Schendel (1918) 55- Mont. 42,
52, 173 P. 1059, 1062. In a comprehensive note on the present status
of our implied conditions precedent in the subscription contract, the
Schendel case is cited as declaring that a "mere statutory privilege
of carrying on such activity as may be necessary or appropriate to
acquire additional subscriptions Is not enough" (to entitle it to collect
on its subscriptions) saying in effect that the case stands for the
propositions that even today a corporation in Montana cannot begin
doing business until all its capital stock is subscribed for. DODD &
BAXF5, CAsES ON CoRPoaATIONs (1940) p. 847.
'TNN. CoDE ANN. (1934) §3714 (5) ; New Jersey, 1 Rmv. STAT. (1937)
§14:2-3; Dzr&wARE REV. Coen (1935) C. 65, §5 (4).
'The conclusion of the Schendel case that the corporation cannot
commence doing business until all of the original capital stock is sub-
scribed, seems to have been based on a finding that, by a "common
law" rule, a corporation could not begin doing business until all of
its original issue of stock was subscribed for, and that there was not
enough evidence in our statutes that our Legislature had intended
to change that rule to justify the Cgurt in finding otherwise. It may
be doubted, however, whether any such rule has ever existed generally
in the United States. Althoughsome decisions have purported to state
suck requirement (notably those first asserting the doctrine that a
subscriber is not liable on his subscriptions until all of the original
issue Is subscribed for) other equally strong early decisions have
2
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It is submitted that a proper construction of our pertinent
statutes gives rise to a presumption that a Montana corporation
may commence business without subscription of any particular
portion of its capital stock. In interpreting the legislative in-
tendment of these statutes, one must bear in mind the existence
of the prevalent business practice of allowing a corporation to
commence business upon the receipt of the certificate of the
secretary of state. The reason advanced in support of this prac-
tice is that many corporations are organized under a plan which
envisages expansion in the future and so the capital stock is
calculated accordingly, to the end that only the portion needed
for present purposes is put up for subscription. R. C. M. 1935,
Section 5908 provides that upon the issuance of the certificate
of the secretary of state showing that articles of incorporation
have been filed, the associates and their successors shall be a
body politic and corporate by the name stated in the certificate.
Of an identical statutory provision, the Supreme Court of
South Dakota has said:
"When the certificate specified in this section is issued,
the corporation would seem to be perfected and possess all
the powers of a corporation." And further "The fact that
our statute does not require of corporations the subscrip-
tion to or payment of a certain portion of its capital stock
before the corporation can transact business imposes upon
persons dealing with the corporation organized under the
laws of this state greater caution and vigilance, but this
court cannot impose upon corporations a greater liability
than is imposed upon them by law."'
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Iowa has said of such a
statute:
ruled to the contrary. For the first position see: People v. National
Savings Bank (1889) 129 IlL. 618, 22 N. E. 288; Stoneham Railroad
Company v. Gould (1854) 2 Gray (Mass.) 211; Livsey v. Omaha Hotel
Company (1876) 5 Neb. 50; Eastern Products Corporation v. Ten-
nessee Coal, Iron & RR.Corporation (1925) 151 Tenn. 239, 269 S. W.
4, 40 A. L. R. 1485. For the second, see: Thorton v. Balsom (1892) 85
Iowa 198, 52 N. W. 190; Johnson v. Kessler (1898) 76 Iowa 411, 41
N. W. 57; Moe v. Harris (1919) 142 Minn. 442, 172 N. W. 494; Bank
v. Hall (1878) 35 Ohio St. Rep. 159; Singer Manufacturing Co. v.
Peck (1896) 9 S. D. 929, 67 N. W. 947; 2 FLrcHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF
THE LAW OF PRIVATE .CoRPORATIONS (1917) §692, p. 1561; RESTAT&-
MENT OF BusiNuss ASSOCIATIONS, TENTATiVE DRAFr No. 3 (1932) §109,
comment a, Modern textual authorities in treating the requirements
of incorporation as being purely statutory seem to assume that there
is no common law requirement that any particular amount of the
capital stock be subscribed before commencement of business. BAi-
LANTINE, PRIVATE CORPORA&TIONS (1927) §15, p. 59. ST'vENs, CoRPORA-
TIONS (1936) §22, p. 99.
'Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Peck (1896) 9 S. D. 929, 67 N. W. 948.
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"The corporation may then lawfully commence busi-
ness,-that is, exercise its corporate authority and power,
-when its articles of incorporation are filed. Nowhere,
is there an intimation in the statute that the authority and
power cannot be exercised until all of its stock has been
subscribed.'
A leading Minnesota case' even more trenchantly declares
that a corporation is entitled to begin doing business as soon
as it files with the secretary of state proof of the publication
of its articles of incorporation-Minnesota's incorporation step
equivalent to receiving the certificate of incorporation in Mon-
tana. It concludes that there is a resulting de jure corpor-
ation, necessarily with the right to do business.
Most persuasive, however, has been the comment of the
Montana Supreme Court on the intendment of these statutes.
The court both prior to and since the dictum of the Schendel
case has given support to the interpretation contended for by
this comment. Thus, in Daily v. Marshall, decided five years
before the Schendel case, the court said:
"When these requirements (i. e. those stated in Sec-
tion 5908, R. C. M. 1935) have been completed, the cor-
poration becomes as to those who deal with it, a living,
active and responsible entity"; and then said, "When a
corporation has regularly been brought into existence it is
not deprived of the right to exercise corporate functions
by the failure of the directors, designated by the statutes
to perfect the organization, to issue stock, or to obtain
subscriptions for its stock, or to elect directors even though
the taking of these various steps is necessary to the proper
use of the franchise."'
'Johnson v. Kessler (1898) 76 Iowa 411, 41 N. W. 57.
'Moe v. Harris (1919) 142 Minn. 442, 172 N. W. 494. It Is true that
some cases have insisted that the mere fact that a statute says un-
equivocally that from a certain moment the incorporators shall be-
come a body politic and corporate, does not establish that such legal
entity has all of the attributes of a fully incorporated group. Beck
v. Stimel (1931) 39 Ohio App. 510, 177 N. E. 920. But evidently the
Minnesota Court could not conceive of a de Jure corporation without
attributing to it the normal incidents of corporateness. It says, "We
are of the opinion that the statute referred to controls, and that a
corporation de jure was organized .... The statute does not make
it a condition precedent to the right of a corporation to transact
business that all or any of its authorized capital stock shall be sub-
scribed or paid In." Moe v. Harris, supra, at p. 443 of 142 Minn.,
p. 495 of 172 N. W. In support of its position, the Minnesota Court
might ask, "What goes to make up the legal entity of de jure cor-
porateness if it is not composed of the bundle of legal incidents or-
dinarily attributable to such entity?"
'Daily v. Marshall (1913) 47 Mont. 377, 395; 133 P. 681, 685.
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Ten years after the Schendel case, the Court reaffirmed
its position taken in Daily v. Marshall and said in Sun River
Stock and Land Company v. Montana Trust and Savings Banks
"The action of the secretary of state upon the con-
ditions here presented was a determination of the corpor-
ation's right to do business.'
While the foregoing statute and the judicial construction
of it would seem sufficient to support the contention of this
comment, it is believed that still other sections of our CoDE
give evidence of the same legislative intent." Thus, R. C. M. 1935,
Section 5914, providing that the issuance of the certificate of the
secretary of state shall be treated as prima facie evidence of the
corporate character and capacity of the corporation and of its
right to transact business, when read in connection with Section
6000, providing that neither the due incorporation of the cor-
poration nor its right to exercise corporate powers shall be col-
laterally attacked in any private suit to which such de facto
corporation may be a party, would reasonably lead one to con-
clude that the legislature intended that once the articles of in-
corporation have been filed and one has extended credit to the
corporation in reliance on the prima facie evidence of its due
incorporation and its right to transact business, the power of
the corporation to continue the transaction of business can be
inquired into only by the state and not by a private person
(such as a subscriber to the capital stock in a private suit by a
corporation to collect on his subscription contract). Here, also,
the construction of the statute presented finds support in the
decisions of the Montana Supreme Court. Thus, the Court has
said in the Sun River case:
" . . . One has a right to rely on the public records, and if
the records in the office of the secretary of state show that
'Sun River Land and Stock Co. v. Montana Trust and Savings Bank
(1928) 81 Mont. 222, 234, 262 P. 1039, 1044.
%OR. C. M. 1935, §5936 provides that directors shall be elected at the
meeting at which the by laws are adopted and §5930 provides that
every corporation formed under this title must within one month after
filing articles of incorporation adopt a code of by laws for its govern-
ment. It may be argued that such provisions are persuasive in de-
termining that the Legislature intended that the corporation may
commence business before all of the capital stock has been subscribed.
In New Haven and Derby Railroad Co. v. Chapman (1871) 38 Conn.
56, 67, the Court said that statutes providing for the election of direc-
tors soon after the filing of the articles of incorporation are intended
as an aid to the corporation in commencing business for there could
be no need for directors if their only function was to secure sub-
scriptions to the capital stock, a function ordinarily performed by the
incorporators.
5
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a company is carrying on a business as a corporation, it
must be considered at least a corporation de facto. The
action of the secretary of state upon the conditions here
presented was a determination of the corporation's right to
do business. The state alone, by a direct proceeding for that
purpose, can challenge the corporation's existence or its
right to do business in this state.'
Thus, the two leading Montana cases on the "right to do
business"," declare that, to determine the legal incidents aris-
ing from the doing of business by a corporation in Montana,
it is a matter of indifference whether the corporation is a de
jure or a de facto corporation. They both equally have the
right at the same moment, so as to prevent any private person
from attacking the corporate action."
Once it is determined that a corporation may commence
business without subscription to all of its capital stock, it would
seem to follow that the corporation has also the right to call
upon subscribers for payment of their subscriptions in order to
obtain money for the prosecution of that business. This doc-
trine must have been recognized by the Court in the ,chendel
'(1928) 81 Mont. 222, 234, 262 P. 1039, 1044.
"Daily v. Marshall (1913) 47 Mont. 377, 133 P. 681; Sun River Stock
and Land Company v. Montana Trust and Savings Bank (1928) 81
Mont. 222, 234, 262 P. I0f9, 1044.
"Perhaps, the most significant conclusion of these two Montana cases
is that under our statutes there flows from the defacto doctrine a
clear cut alternative method for incorporating so far as both the
powers and the rights of a corporation to deal with a private in-
dividual are concerned. Indeed, the proposition of these cases seems
to contribute considerably to the question of when a pre-incorporation
subscriber is liable on his subscription. Whether defacto corporat-
ness should make the subscriber immediately liable because the cor-
poration can commence business has not been considered by the
authorities. DODD AND BAKER, CASES ON CORPORATIONS (1940) pp.
847 to 849. If the de facto doctrine still rested on pure estoppel, of
course, the established rights of a third party subscriber should not
be changed by an estoppel operating against an individual person
dealing with the corporation. But it is submitted that in Montana
and all other states where the de facto doctrine results in an alter-
native method for incorporating, this should be such right to do busi-
ness as to subject the subscriber to immediate liability. Only thus
can the public be adequately protected in dealing with a de facto
corporation. STrvENs, CoRPoRATIoNs (1936) §31, p. 151. (Of course
there is the complication that, in many states, it likewise has been
said that a condition precedent to the subscriber's liability is that
he be given a de jure corporation. But the view of substantial
authority today, that this condition must stand or fall along with the
condition that all of the stock be subscribed for according to whether
the de facto doctrine be treated as essentially a mere estoppel or as
an alternative method of incorporation, seems to be essentially sound.
McCarter v. Ketchum (1905) 72 N. J. L. 247, 62 Atl. 693; STEVENS,
CoRpoRA ioNs (1936) §89, p. 352; RESTATEMENT oF BusnEss AssOCIA-
TiONS, TENTATIVE DRAr No. " (1932) §107, comment 2.)
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case for the Court, after holding that a stock subscriber is not
obligated on his subscription contract until all of the capital
stock has been subscribed, felt itself obliged to conclude that
all stock must be subscribed before the corporation could com-
mence business. The correlation of these two rules was most
clearly and forcibly stated by the Supreme Court of Kansas
when that Court said:
"To say that the company is authorized to carry out
the purposes of its organization, and yet that it cannot call
for a dollar of its subscriptions to the capital stock, seems
to us absurd in the extreme. The most reasonable view is
that the legislature had in view the actual situation and
wants of a young and growing state and recognized the fact
that almost every corporation in this state commenced its
enterprise with bilt part of its stock subscribed, and relied
on obtaining further subscriptions as the enterprise should
be forwarded.'
This doctrine has been frequently reiterated by many courts
and has the support of text writers.' Even the two principal
cases relied on by the Montana decision to justify its conclusion
that there is a well established "condition precedent" in all
pre-incorporation subscriptions that all the stock be subscribed
for before any subscriber is liable theron, cannot be cited to
deny this proposition.' In Stoneham Railroad Company v.
Gould," the Massachusetts Court was confronted with statutes"
under which the corporation was expressly forbidden to com-
"Hunt v. Kansas and Missouri Bridge Co. (1873) 11 Kan. 311, 334;
"Arkadelphia Cotton Mills v. Trimbel (1891) 54 Ark. 316, 15 S. W.
776; Norton v. Lamb (1936) 144 Kan. 665, 62 P. (2d) 1311; Lincoln
Shoe Manufacturing Co. v. Sheldon (1895) 44 Neb. 279, 62 N. W.
480; Val verde Hotel Co. v. Hubbell (1921) 27 N. Mex. 545, 202 P.
982; Utah Hotel Co. v. Madsen (1913) 43 Utah 285, 134 P. 577; BAL-
LANTINE, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1927) §40, p. 130. DODD & BAKER,
CAsES ON CORPORATIONS (1940) pp. 847 to 849.
Hunt v. Kansas and Missouri Bridge Co. (1873) 11 Kan. 311, 334,
bases its decision on what the reasonable expectancy of a subscriber
should be in the light of the right of the corporation to commence
business when only a portion of Its capital stock has been sub-
scribed. It correctly interprets the law and practice today. The old
cases establishing the implied condition precedent as a defense as-
sumed that the subscriber was justified in expecting all of the stock
to be first subscribed-a presumption altogether inconsistent with
the modern law and practice. Hence, there seems to be nothing in-
herently unjust In denying such defense today, as thought by Chief
Justice Brantly In the Schendel case. Indeed justice seems to be
with the corporate creditors---supporting the subscriber's liability.
"Stoneham Railroad Company v. Gould (1854) 2 Gray (Mass.) 211;
Llvsey v. Omaha Hotel Co. (1876) 5 Neb. 50.
"Sutpra, note 16.
"Ch. 139, §7 STATUTES OF MASS. (1851).
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mence business until all of the capital stock was subscribed.
There the Court had no opportunity to apply the thesis of this
comment. The statutes forbade its application. The other case
arose in Nebraska." It was decided along with a number of
other similar cases arising out of the same transaction." From
a close reading of these related cases, it appears that the sub-
scription contracts involved in each contained clauses providing
that when $150,000 of a capital stock of $200,000 should be
subscribed (exclusive of the value of a location amounting to
an estimated $50,000, which was given to the Hotel Company)
the stockholders should arrange for the construction of the
hotel. Clearly, such a provision in the subscription contract
would prevent a court from denying to the defendant his de-
fense. But neither the statutes nor the subscription provisions
prevented the court in the Montana case from overruling the
defendant's demurrer. It would seem that both the business
practice and other Montana decisions should have lead the Court
in this case to rule that a pre-incorporation subscriber's lia-
bility is not contingent on a showing that any particular per-
centage of the original issue of stock has been subscribed for.1
"Supra, note 16.
2*Sweeny v. Omaha Hotel Co. (1876) 5 Neb. 75; Estabrook v. Omaha
Hotel Co. (1876) 5 Neb. 76; Boehme v. Omaha Hotel Co. (1876) 5
Neb. 80; Frost v. Omaha Hotel Co. (1876) 5 Neb. 83.
"Courts generally recognize far too little the fact that many rules of
corporation law are Interdependent so that if one changes all other
interdependent ones should likewise be adjusted. Though Judge
Brantly purports to recognize this fact in admitting the necessity of
finding that a Montana corporation cannot commence business im-
mediately upon incorporation, it seems evident that he assumes the
inherent desirability of the defense given the subscriber by the im-
plied condition precedent in his subscription. He declares that, "The
fact that several provisions of the code, . . . imply that organization
may be effected prior to subscription for all the stock, does not re-
quire the conclusion that the legislature intended to set aside, annul,
or modify a settled rule of law founded upon a 'plain dictate of jus-
tice and the strict principles regulating the obligations of contracts.'
In our opinion, nothing short of an express provision on the sub-
ject would suffice to accomplish this." On the contrary, it would seem
that the speciousness of the argument quoted upon which was orig-
inally predicated this defense, should rule it out of the law without
further inquiry: "When a man subscribes a share to a stock, to con-
sist of 1,000 shares in order to carry on some designated enterprise,
he binds himself to pay a thousandth part of the cost of such enter-
prise. If only 500 are subscribed for, and he can have no assurance
which he is bound to accept that the remainder will be taken, he would
be held if liable to assessment to pay a five-hundredth part of the
cost of the enterprise, besides Incurring the risk of entire failure of
the enterprise itself, and the loss of the amount advanced towards
it." Stoneham Railroad Co. v. Gould (1854) 2 Gray (Mass.) 211.
Surely, this is a grossly inaccurate description both of what a stock
8
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We have found that there are very persuasive arguments
supporting the conclusion that because a corporation has a right
to commence business at once a subscriber should be liable on
his subscription as soon as his subscription is accepted after
incorporation. If the Court had been inclined to refer to it,
there is at least one other statute" which could easily be con-
sidered as absolutely controlling our case, making the defend-
ant immediately liable on his contract. It provides:
"The stockholders of every corporation shall be sev-
erally and individually liable to the creditors of the cor-
poration, until the whole amount of unpaid stock held by
them respectively, for all acts and contracts made by such
corporation, until the whole amount of capital stock sub-
scribed for shall have been paid in."
If the right created by the Section should be interpreted
as being contingent upon the corporation having a right to sue,
it would have little significance for us. However, assuming
that the Court would apply the generally established rule that
the rights given by a statute, clear and explicit on its face,
must not be added to nor taken from,' under this Section cred-
itors should have an unqualified right" to recover from all
stockholders for any amount legally due on their subscriptions.
subscriber contracts for and of his measure of iability In case only
part of the authorized capitalization is subscribed.
For an example of a court acting at its best In correlating inter-
dependent rules, see Robertson v. Nicholes Co., Inc. et al. (1931) 141
Misc. 660, 253 N. Y. Supp. 76. It ruled that the established right of
the stQck purchaser to sue the corporation in conversion for its failure
to register him as owner, must be abrogated in view of a recently
enacted statutory prohibition against the corporation buying Its own
stock except out of surplus.
-R. C. M. 1935, §5966.
"R. C. M. 1935, §10519 provides: "In the construction of a statute
or instrument, the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and
declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to
insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted; and
where there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction
is, If possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all." The statute
would seem to be a statutory declaration of the rule of construction
contended for. The following Montana cases also recognize the rule.
Smith v. Iron Mountain Tunnel Co. (1912) 46 Mont. 13, 125 P. 649,
Ann. Cas. 1914B, 551; State v. Moody (1924) 71 Mont. 473, 230 P.
575; Sullivan v. Anselmo Mining Corporation, (1928) 82 Mont. 543,
268 P. 495; State ex rel. DuFresne v. Leslie (1935) 100 Mont. 449,
50 P. (2d) 959, 101 A. L. R. 1329; Vaughn and Ragsdale Co., Inc.
v. State Board of Equalization (1939) 109 Mont. 52, 96 P. (2d) 420.
"Kelly v. Clark (1898) 21 Mont. 291, 53 P. 959; and King v. Pony
Gold Mining Co. (1903) 28 Mont. 74, 72 P. 309, hold that the right
secured under this Section was secondary In that it did not accrue
until the remedy of the creditor against the corporation had been
exhausted. Cf. Rohr v. Stanton (1927) 78 Mont. 494, 254 P. 869.
9
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It seems extremely unlikely that the legislature would recog-
nize an enforceable right to collect inhering directly in the
creditors, with no right at all in the corporation at the time.
Hence this Section seems to assume an already existing liability
to the corporation, as also is indicated in its language, 'until
the... captal stock,... shall have been paid in.", which clearly
refers to payment to the corporation. Very possibly Judge
Brantly's decision would have been the same had this Section
been argued before him, since he stated that he would bow only
before a positive provision repealing the subscriber's defense.
However, to a mind not already made up, this Section seems
extremely persuasive, particularly when considered cumula-
tively with the evidence that a corporation has a right to com-
mence business as soon as its certificate of incorporation is
issued.'
-Ben Berg, Jr.
CORPORATIONS: VALIDITY OF A CONTRACT TO
ISSUE* STOCK FOR FUTURE SERVICES
The MONTANA CONSTrruTIoN Article XV, Section 10, con-
tains a clause similar to that found in the constitutions or
statutes of many other states. It provides:
"No corporation shall issue stock or bonds, except for
labor done, services performed, or money and property ac-
tually received; and all fictitious increase of stock or in-
debtedness shall be void. "
In Kirkup v. Anaconda Amusement Co.' the Montana Su-
preme Court was called upon to construe the phrase "labor
mAs always is true where presumptions are to be indulged in, they
may point in both directions at once. It would be possible to say
that though this Section's language is unqualified, there still is room
for the operation of the implied conditions; ie., that the operation of
the Section is contingent upon a liability by the defendant to the
corporation so that the implied condition precedent would protect the
subscriber against both the corporation and the creditor under this
Section. Again, it would be possible to consider this statute as being
an extremely enlightened provision seeking to more adequately pro-
tect the interests of all persons entitled to such protection, giving the
corporate creditor the amount of relief that he absolutely needs, even
though the stockholder may have a defense against the corporation
under the impoled condition precedent. Both rationalizations are
highly improbable in view of both the history of our CODE, and of the
wording of the Section itself.
*The term "issue" is used herein to mean the allotment of stock as
fully-paid shares--not the mere formal issuance of a share certificate.
'(1921) 59 Mont. 469, 197 P. 1005, 17 A. L. R. 441.
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